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NOTES
GIDEON, ESCOBEDO, MIRANDA: BEGRUDGING ACCEPTANCE OF
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S MANDATES
IN FLORIDA
Attempting to assess the attitude of a state's system of courts toward a
controversial group of United States Supreme Court decisions is a perplexing
and difficult task. Court decisions and the judicial language contained therein
admit of varying interpretations. With no guidelines established for such
an analysis, the speculative conclusions this writer reaches are only his own.
The general survey that follows represents one student's assessment of the
attitudes and reactions of the Florida supreme court and district courts to
the Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda decisions of the United States Supreme
Court.
Due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with
rights of the accused did not originate with the petition of Clarence Gideon
in 1963. The road toward Gideon was a long one. In Betts v. Brady' and
Powell v. Alabama standards very similar to those in Gideon were enunciated.
These were couched in vague due process language and were not made
mandatory for the states through the fourteenth amendment. One commentator gives three basic reasons why state courts did not generally observe
and follow the evolution of the Betts doctrine regarding right to counsel:3
(1) due process decisions were difficult to evaluate unless they were
considered in terms of particular and definite facts;
(2) since these decisions concerned such subjective ideas as fairness,
state court judges were more concerned with their own conceptions than
they were with those of the Supreme Court.
(3) because of force of habit, it probably was not customary in such
cases to appoint counsel to serve without pay.
Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda with clearer language, more exact
standards, and mandatory application to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, forced changes in state criminal procedure and due process.
Florida's judicial attitude toward these decisions and the changes they
wrought cannot, in all candor, be characterized as favorable.
The immediate impact of the Gideon decision in Florida was the Florida
supreme court's promulgation on April 1, 1963, of Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure Number One.4 Rule One, establishing collateral attack procedure

1. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
2. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
3. Milledge, Escobedo - Toward Eliminating Coerced Confessions, 19 U. MIAMI L. REv.
415, 416-17 (1965).
4. See Brown, Collateral Post Conviction Remedies in Florida, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 306
(1968); Note, Florida'sCriminal Procedure Rule Number One, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 617 (1965).
[346]
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for future and prior convictions, was the response. of the Florida supreme
court to an anticipated landslide of collateral attacks due to Gideon's
retroactive effect. Gideon, then, imposed an added burden on the Florida
courts. The courts were to give the petitioner in a Rule One proceeding every
possible benefit of the doubt 5 and were to allow an evidentiary hearing
whenever doubt existed regarding petitioner's claims.
It is questionable, from the initial decisions subsequent to Gideon,
whether petitioners were, in fact, given every benefit of the doubt in collateral
attack proceedings. According to one writer over twenty-five Florida judgments were vacated and remanded to the Florida supreme court from the
United States Supreme Court for further consideration in the light of
Gideon v. Wainwright.,
It is noteworthy in this regard, that as a counterreaction to the advent of
Rule One proceedings, requirements for its application were made quite
stringent. Strick adherence to form and detail is required in submitting
petitions for post conviction relief,7 even though prisoners do not have attorneys to help them and normally prepare the petitions themselves. In one
recent case, the prisoner was not allowed an evidentiary hearing because his
motion neglected to state that he was an indigent at the time of his arrest
and trial. s Nor has this "tightening up" of the judicial reins since Gideon
been limited to requirements of form. In State v. Jones,9 the accused
appealed the affirmation of a murder conviction by the district court of appeal.
The issue on certiorari involved a point of procedural due process regarding
"inappropriate remarks" of the prosecuting attorney during trial. Normally,
such inappropriate remarks will not be reviewed by the appellate court unless
timely objection is made by the defense. There is an exception to this rule,
however, which holds that if the remarks are of such character that "neither
rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influence, a new
trial should be awarded regardless of want of timely objection."'- The Florida
supreme court in State v. Jones stated, regarding this point:"
Previous decisions of this court indicate broad liberality in applying
the exception. . . .Such an attitude was appropriate . . .prior to
Gideon v. Wainwright.... Application of the exception is no longer
necessary to protect those charged with crime who may be ignorant of
their rights. Their rights are now well guarded by defending counsel.
Under these circumstances further application of the exception will
contribute nothing to the administration of justice, but rather will
tend to provoke censure of the judicial process as permitting "the use
of loopholes, technicalities and delays in the law which frequently
benefit rogues at the expense of decent members of society."
5. Andrews v. State, 160 So. 2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Note, supra note 4, at 620.
6. Note, supra note 4, at 631.
7. Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1968).
8. Coleman v. State, 183 So. 2d 714 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
9. 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967).
10. See, e.g., Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 483, 23 So. 2d 558, 559 (1945); Handley v.
State, 125 Fla. 632, 170 So. 748 (1936).
11. 204 So. 2d 515, 518, 519 (Fla. 1967).
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Thus, while Gideon has added the Rule One motion to the burden of the
courts it apparently has also lightened the courts' responsibility to the extent
that more reliance is put on defense counsel. It seems as if the end result,
while assuring defendants better protection of their rights than previously,
may also work to the advantage of the prosecutor.
Though Gideon resulted in a streamlining of Florida's criminal procedure,
the judicial attitude engendered by its application has resulted in timidity
of application as well as a tightening up of concomitant rules and exceptions.
Narrowness of interpretation has characterized Gideon's application by the
Florida supreme court. One early decision considered Gideon a recession
from Betts v. Brady,'1 2 whereas most writers have considered Gideon the
logical extension of the Betts doctrine to the states. 13
Subsequent application and interpretation of Gideon by the Florida
supreme court in light of the later Escobedo and Miranda decisions indicates
a slightly more liberal attitude. 14 However, the court has avoided extending
Gideon to require right to counsel on appeal from the denial of post conviction relief' 5 in spite of a contrary United States Supreme Court case.16
Nor has the court extended Gideon to misdemeanors. 7 It is interesting to
note at this point that no Florida supreme court decision was found that
directly or indirectly praised the Gideon decision. Initial reception of Gideon
was characterized by hesitant, narrow application and begrudging acceptance.
The more recent cases, while somewhat more liberal in applying Gideon,
do not indicate any fundamental change of attitude.
The general attitude of the Florida district courts of appeal toward
Gideon, while basically similar to that of the Florida supreme court, has
been somewhat more favorable, especially since the Miranda decision. While
each of the district courts is a separate entity, their attitudes toward the
Gideon decision are basically the same. Hence, they will be looked at as
a unit.
12.

Roy v. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963).

13.

See Milledge, supra note 3; Comment, The Right to Counsel Prior to Trial in State

Criminal Proceedings,17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 371 (1963).
14. See, e.g., Ray v. State, 200 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1967); Walls v. State, 199 So. 2d 724
(Fla. 1967).
15. State v. Herzig, 208 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1968); Weeks v. State, 156 So. 2d 36 (3d
D.C.A. 1963), rev'd, 166 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1964). All of the Florida district courts of appeal
had held that an indigent does have an absolute right to the assistance of counsel at a
post conviction proceeding, basing their holdings on the implications found in Gideon,
Escobedo, and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The state appealed the Weeks
decision to the Florida supreme court, which reversed. This example is illustrative of the
tendency observed throughout this survey, for the district courts to be more liberal in
interpreting and applying the United States Supreme Court decisions than the Florida
supreme court. However, a more recent case of the Florida supreme court, Bashlor v.
Wainwright, 189 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1966), indicates perhaps a loosening of the court's attitude
toward extending the right to counsel to denials of post conviction relief.
16. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17. Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964). A possible trend toward the extension of
Gideon to misdemeanors is seen in Justice Ervin's dissent in State v. Warden of Orange
Prison Farm, 193 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1967). A federal district court in Florida has granted
right to counsel to persons charged with misdemeanors punishable by imprisonment for
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The district courts do not seem as hesitant in their application of Gideon
as does the Florida supreme court. There seems to be a greater disinclination
to affirm summary dismissals without requiring an evidentiary hearing. 8
Also, the later decisions illustrate something more than begrudging acceptance.' 9 For instance, in Smith v. State the First District Court of Appeal
20
stated:
The United States Supreme Court has made it abundantly dear,
beginning with Gideon v. Wainwright . . . that an indigent person
charged with a felony is entitled to court appointed counsel under the
guarantee of counsel provision of the Sixth Amendment, Constitution
of the United States. Such guarantee is made applicable and is binding
upon the states by the due process dame of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But complete acceptance of Gideon by the district courts still remains to be
accomplished. For instance, in a 1966 Second District Court of Appeal
21
decision the following language is found:
The "motion" of defendant... was in the usual crude, ungrammatical,
disjointed, muddled, misspelled, confused and generally irresponsible
pattern of similar handwritten, assembly-line documents that have
been figuratively spewing from the State Correctional Institutions
since Gideon....

The allegations are replete with generalities and conclusions
...
and indicate a dear resemblance to the rather stereotyped form of such
motions which started flowing from the advent of Gideon.
Later decisions of the same court, however, indicate a less hostile attitude
2
toward Gideon. 2
The attitude of the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal illustrate
substantially the same pattern - initial begrudging acceptance followed by
a more liberal application and acceptance in light of Escobedo and Miranda.
The present attitude is characterized best by the following language of
the Third District Court of Appeal, quoting from a Florida supreme court
23
case:
A plea of guilty . . . is not a waiver of the right to assistance of
counsel. . . . It is for this very reason that assistance of counsel in
felony cases has been elevated to due process status.
more than six months. Brunson v. State of Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
18. See, e.g., Bogan v. State, 211 So. 2d 74 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1968); Davis v. State, 191
So. 2d 440 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966); Barton v. State, 182 So. 2d 655 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
19. See, e.g., Reddick v. State, 190 So. 2d 340 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Gentry v. State,
186 So. 2d 531 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
20. 198 So. 2d 641, 642 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
21. Crusoe v. State, 183 So. 2d 600, 602 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
22. See, e.g., Bogan v. State, 211 So. 2d 74 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); State v. Dixon, 193
So. 2d 62 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966); Reddick v. State, 190 So. 2d 340 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
23. Davis v. State, 191 So. 2d 440, 441 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
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A more specific example is seen in the Third District Court of Appeal
decision in Colebrook v. State where the court, speaking somewhat metaphorically, interpreted Miranda, Gideon, Escobedo, and Massiah as attempts to
resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society -interests
that the court said must be weighed according to the facts of each individual
case:

24

We believe that man is still essentially a "moral" being and that
occasionally when he has sinned, or committed a crime, his conscience
bothers him and he may want to confess, whether an attorney is
present or not, and if properly advised of his constitutional rights
such confessions are admissible in evidence, in Florida.
Hence, it appears in general that the Florida courts have accepted and
applied the Gideon decision with something less than enthusiasm, with the
Florida supreme court being more conservative in its application than the
district courts of appeal. The damming of the initial flood of Rule One
petitions and the subsequent extension of Gideon principles in Escobedo and
Miranda have produced wider acceptance and more liberal application of
Gideon. However, if the initial attitude of the Florida courts to Gideon is
viewed as something less than enthusiastic, this attitude becomes decidedly
more pronounced with regard to the related subsequent decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
Escobedo v. Illinois25 renders inadmissible statements elicited by police

during in-custody interrogations if the accused's request to consult his attorney
is denied and he has not been warned of his absolute right to remain silent.
Holding that one's constitutional right to counsel arises at that "critical
stage" in the proceeding when the investigation begins to focus on the
defendant, Escobedo extends the holding in Gideon. It is noteworthy, also,
that the dissents in Escobedo indicate that the majority intended by their
decision to deemphasize the voluntary-involuntary test for admissibility of
28
confessions.
Miranda v. Arizona further expands Gideon and Escobedo in holding
2
that: 7
[T]he prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
The procedural safeguards set out in Miranda stipulate that prior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
24.
25.
26.
27.

205 So. 2d 675, 681 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Id. at 495 (Clark, Stewart, White, JJ. dissenting).
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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"

that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney. These safeguards -were to
be independent of the traditional voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility
of out-of-court statments.
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was to a large part caused by
confusion in the state and federal courts over the breadth of interpretation
to be given the Escobedo decision. 28 The broad mandates of these two
decisions have encountered resistance by the Florida courts. While Escobedo's
reception has been exemplified by strictness of interpretation, Miranda,
amplifying Escobedo, has aroused a very narrow, suspicious attitude among
the Florida courts, especially by the Florida supreme court. Such an attitude,
best characterized as begrudging acceptance, seems to be thawing in the
decisions of the district courts of appeal, especially in the second district.
Both Escobedo and Miranda have been held to have no retroactive
application in Florida.2 9 But nonretroactivity alone does not hinder the
application of Escobedo and Miranda in Florida. More importantly, a
judicial attitude exists that places the narrowest possible interpretation on
these decisions, distinguishes them away factually and continues to apply
and emphasize the voluntariness test of admissibility. Such an attitude results
in emasculation of the constitutional import of these decisions and indirectly
denies to the criminally accused the mandates of the United States Supreme
Court.
Since the Escobedo decision expanded the definition of "criminal prosecution," found in the sixth amendment, to include interrogations that have
shifted from investigatory to accusatory, it is interesting to note the tenor of
the Florida supreme court's pronouncements in this area. The majority in
Escobedo indicated that both the preliminary hearing and the arraignment
might be considered "critical stages" in a criminal prosecution entitling
one to counsel. 30 Though the Florida supreme court has considered an
arraignment such as critical stage,3' it has not so considered the preliminary
hearing.32 Notably, the Second District Court of Appeal has swung away
from the Florida supreme court's pronouncement by joining the United States
Supreme Court in holding that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage
33
of the prosecution for a capital offense.
Miranda finally defined custodial interrogation to be that point when
a person is in custody or deprived by officers of his freedom of action in
any significant way. Yet, by emphasizing the voluntariness test and utilizing
the device of the extrajudicial confession, and more recently by very narrowly
applying the Miranda definition of custodial interrogation,3 4 the Florida
28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442, 465 (1966).
29. See, e.g., Bashlor v. Wainwright, 189 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1966); Hilson v. State, 191

So. 2d 90 (2d D.CGA. Fla. 1966).
80.
31.
82.
83.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).
Sardinia v. State, 168 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1964).
Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 US. 1023 (1966).
Williams v. State, 184 So. 2d 525 (4th D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied, 195 So. 2d 202

(Fla. 1967).
84. See, e.g., Holston v. State, 208 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968); Shaw v. State, 209 So. 2d 477
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courts have succeeded to a large degree in circumventing the mandates of
Escobedo and Miranda.
An extrajudicial confession is one given out-of-court and not in the
presence of a judge.35 Since the majority of all confessions are given out of
court, the Supreme Court surely did not intend to include only judicial
confessions within the purview of its decisions in Escobedo and Miranda.
Yet this is the impression one gets from a reading of the Florida cases.
In one leading case, Montgomery v. State,36 the Florida supreme court
held that an extrajudicial confession was admissible even though the accused
was without benefit of counsel and was not warned of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent. This decision was subsequent to Escobedo, but
prior to Miranda. Relying on the Escobedo decision the defendant contended that in addition to proving the voluntariness of the confession, the
state must also show that at the time of the interrogation the accused was
effectively advised of his right to remain silent. The court, however, held
that the principles found in Escobedo were not controlling under the cir37
cumstances and said of that decision:
A majority of the Court held, by what seems to be a kind of judicial
legerdemain, that the accused's incriminating statements . . . even
though proved to have been made voluntarily . . . were rendered

inadmissible by the refusal of the police to allow Escobedo to consult
with his attorney....
In view of the fact that the majority opinion .

. .

noted several

times that due process was denied "under the facts of this case," or
similar language, we do not conceive that it intended to overrule its
previous decisions holding extrajudicial confessions admissible in a
proper case even though the accused did not have the benefit of
counsel at the time. ...

Besides indicating a dissatisfaction with the Escobedo decision, the case
illustrates the narrowness of interpretation that has characterized the Florida
supreme court's attitude toward pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court in this area. Admission of extrajudicial confessions under these
circumstances ignores the safeguards that Escobedo indicated were to be
applied independently of the voluntary-involuntary test. Applying the
additional safeguards helps to mitigate the unfair situation where the judge
must choose between conflicting statements of officers and of the accused
regarding the voluntariness of the confession. "Implicit in Escobedo is a
distrust of law enforcement officials." 38
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Adjmi v. State, 208 So. 2d 859 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1958); Wingard v.
State, 208 So. 2d 263 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Biglow v. State, 205 So. 2d 547 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1967).
35. 2 FLA. WORDS AND PHRASES 46 (Supp. 1967). See also Epperly v. State, 189 So. 2d
531, 538 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
36.

176 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1023 (1966), rehearing denied, 385

U.S. 892 (1966). See also Outten v. State, 197 So. 2d 594 (2d D.C.A. 1967), rev'd, 206 So. 2d
392 (Fla. 1968).
37. Montgomery v. State, 176 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1965).
38. Comment, Criminal Law: Right to Counsel During Interrogation in State Prosecu-
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That the majority in Escobedo no longer considered the voluntaryinvoluntary test to be practical is indicated by the great reliance placed upon

the Supreme Court's prior decision, Massiah v. United States,39 in which
the Court quoted: 40
[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel
at... trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant
under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less ... might deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice
would help him."
Thus, the Supreme Court certainly intended the additional safeguards of
being warned of one's right to remain silent and of an attorney if requested,
to apply to extrajudicial confessions. The dissenting opinions in Massiah,
Escobedo, and Miranda indicated also that the Court was placing a much
reduced emphasis on the voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility, emphasizing in its stead the constitutional safeguards made obligatory upon the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
Yet, in spite of the language in Massiah and Escobedo, the Florida
supreme court continues to circumvent application of constitutional safeguards designed to guard against unreliable statements by deeming confessions
extrajudicial. This attitude apparently has prevailed even after the Supreme
Court's explicit pronouncements in Miranda. In Holston v. State,41 the
Florida supreme court, applying the voluntariness test, held that an incriminating extrajudicial statement given a trustee by defendant while he was
incarcerated in the county jail was admissible because the case "could not
properly be described as conduct of custodial interrogation." 42 Miranda was
held inapplicable because the trustee was not a law enforcement officer.
Yet, the defendant was incarcerated with no indication that he was advised
of his constitutional rights, nor was an attorney present. The case is also
illustrative of the recent tendency of the Florida courts to narrowly define the
term "custodial interrogation," indirectly ignoring the explicit definition in
Miranda. Admission of extrajudicial statements under these circumstances
goes far in simply ignoring the admonitions of Escobedo and Miranda.
It appears that while the Florida supreme court broadly defines the types
of custodial interrogation encompassed by the Miranda decision,4 3 the court
has adopted a very circumscribed interpretation of the actual term itself.
In spite of the explicit definition in Escobedo, Miranda explicitly defined
custodial interrogation in order to clear up confusion and open avoidance of
Escobedo's applicability by the state courts. Yet it appears that the Florida
tions, 17 U. FLA. L. Rzv. 634, 635 (1965).
89. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
40. Escobedo v. Illinois, 578 U.S. 478, 484 (1964). See also Massiah v. United States,
877 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
41. 208 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968).
42. Id. at 100.
43. See State ex rel. Lowe v. Nelson, 210 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1968).
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courts continue indirectly to avoid the admonitions of Escobedo and Miranda
by either the device of the so-called "extrajudicial confession" or by narrowly
defining custodial interrogation.
Decisions of the First, Third, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal also
illustrate the tendency to hold the safeguards of Escobedo and Miranda
inapplicable either on the ground that the confessions are extrajudicial or
that there has been no custodial interrogation. 4 4 In Myrick v. State,45 decided
after Escobedo and before Miranda, the First District Court of Appeal, citing
Montgomery v. State, held admissible the extrajudicial confession of a
wounded defendant appearing "physically weak but mentally alert" 46 taken
at a hospital only two days after the shooting. The defendant at that time
was under arrest, had not been before a magistrate, did not have an attorney,
though he did not request one, and was not informed that his statements
could be used against him. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
application of the voluntary-involuntary test and concluded that since the
confession was given voluntarily and extrajudicially, it was admissible notwithstanding the Escobedo decision. Escobedo was held inapplicable for the
additional reason that the defendant never actually requested an attorney,
while at the same time the court recognized the prophecy in Justice White's
Escobedo dissent that future Supreme Court pronouncements would abandon
47
the request requirement:
We are not in the instant case controlled by the dissenting opinion,
however accurate may be Mr. Justice White's predictions of the future
actions of the United States Supreme Court. The fact remains that the
Escobedo majority opinion is explicitly limited to the facts of that
case, and the principle announced therein involves the criteria for
determining whether an accused is deprived of his right to counsel
by the states refusal to grant his request to consult with his counsel.
Since no such request . . . was involved in the case sub judice, the
principle in that case is not controlling here.
Other cases from the First District Court of Appeal indicate a similar
narrow interpretation,48 as well as continued emphasis and reliance upon
the voluntary-involuntary test and the judicially created extrajudicial confession exception to the principles of Escobedo and Miranda.49 In one case
defendant alleged that he requested to use the phone to call an attorney
but was refused until after his interrogation. The decision gave no indication
that the police denied or refuted defendant's contention. Nonetheless,
applying the voluntariness test, defendant's incriminating statements were
admitted and used to convict him.50 In a later case, the defendant contended
44. See cases cited note 34 supra.
45. 177 So. 2d 845 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
46. Id. at 847.
47. Id. at 849.
48. See, e.g., Campfield v. State, 189 So. 2d 642 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Turvey v. State,
174 So. 2d 609 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
49. See, e.g., Manuel v. State, 190 So. 2d 1 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966); Dampier v. State, 180
So. 2d 183 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
50. Dampier v. State, 180 So. 2d 183 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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that he was held incommunicado and under punishment (by being kept in
the infamous "flat top" at Raiford State Prison) and that he was denied the
right to assistance of counsel at interrogation.51 The court held Escobedo
inapplicable and admitted defendant's statements since they constituted an
extrajudicial confession, properly tested by the applicable rules for voluntariness.
The attitude of the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal is very
similar to that of the First District Court of Appeal and will not be dealt
with in detail. Initial decisions demonstrated a wary reluctance to apply
Escobedo and nonapplication whenever possible on grounds of nonretroactivity,5 2 alleged factual distinctions,5 3 and the extrajudicial confession
exception." As with the Florida supreme court and the First District Court
of Appeal, this results in the admission of extrajudicial confessions without
the necessity of applying the constitutional safeguards implicit in the Escobedo and subsequent Mirandadecisions. Later decisions of the Third District
Court of Appeal, subsequent to Miranda, while generally indicative of an
attitude of resigned acceptance, continue to avoid applicability of Escobedo
and
and Miranda by narrowly defining the phrase "custodial interrogation"
55
broadly defining the phrase "volunteered spontaneous statement."
Open hostility toward Escobedo and Miranda was expressed by one judge
dissenting in a Third District Court of Appeal opinion.5 6 The case involved
the validity and legality of a search incident to an arrest. Though the
legality of the search was questionable, the defendant's. conviction was affirmed by the majority. Judge Boyer, dissenting, condemned the search as
exploratory and said regarding the conduct of police officers involved: "It
is just such conduct . . . which breeds such unpopular and unpalatable
decisions as Escobedo and Miranda. . . ."57 It seems ironic that this judge
who laments improper police conduct can, at the same time, condemn the
decisions that may have gone the furthest toward eliminating the very evil
he laments.
Decisions subsequent to Miranda's clarification of the standards regarding
admissibility generally indicate an attitude of begrudging acceptance 55
"[1]n the Miranda case... the Supreme Court of the United States
held contrary to the Florida rulings on that point.... Therefore, we
51. Epperly v. State, 189 So. 2d 531, 533 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1966).
52. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 183 So. 2d 593 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1966); Bell v. State, 175
So. 2d 80 (3d D.CA.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 209 (Fla.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 954 (1965).

53. Dovico v. State, 199 So. 2d 308 (4th D.CA. Fa. 1967); Morgan v. State, 177 So. 2d
60 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
54. Dovico v. State, 199 So. 2d 308 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1967); Male v. State, 189 So. 2d 521
(3d D.C.A. 1966), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 813 (Fla.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 927 (1967).
55. See, e.g., Adjmi v. State, 208 So. 2d 859 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Battles v. State, 208
So. 2d 150 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Biglow v. State, 205 So. 2d 547 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
56. Lowe v. State, 191 So. 2d 303 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
57. Id. at 307.
58. Jones v. State, 200 So. 2d 574, 576 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). See also Young v. State,
203 So. 2d 650 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
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must give due consideration to the views expressed by the Supreme
Court of the United States....
Such a statement probably is characteristic of the present attitude of all
the Florida courts, with the exception of the Second District Court of Appeal.
The more recent decisions of that court indicate an attitude that stands in
contrast to the judicial attitude thus far assessed, and deserves detailed
analysis.
The early decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal follow the
same pattern seen elsewhere. The court narrowly interpreted the Escobedo
decision to preclude its applicability. For instance, in one decision, after
noting that Escobedo was a 5-4 decision, the court stated: 59
The majority there held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
were violated by the introduction . . . of an incriminating statement

elicited under certain described circumstances, including, among
others, a refusal by the police to honor the defendant's request to
consult with his lawyer during the course of the interrogation which
produced the statement. A casual reading of the ... majority opinion
discloses that it is based upon numerous circumstances . . . not

present here.
In other cases, Escobedo's applicability was brushed off with no other explanation than that "The record clearly does not bring this case within the rule
established in Escobedo ..

."60

The early cases of the Second District Court of Appeal subsequent to
Escobedo show also a reliance on the voluntariness test and the extrajudicial
confession exception to Escobedo. It bears repeating that in applying the
voluntary-involuntary test the situation almost invariably arises that the
judge must decide whether to admit a confession by weighing the testimony
of the interrogating law enforcement officers against that of the accused.
The United States Supreme Court considered this standard of admissibility
impractical and added safeguards to the rights of the accused that were to
be applied independently of their voluntariness test. An example of the
unhealthy situation for defendants that Escobedo sought to eliminate is seen
in Moffett v. State:61
[T]he testimony was conflicting as to whether defendant requested
and was denied an opportunity to consult with his attorney and
whether his confession was voluntary or induced by threats. The
credibility of the witnesses was for the trial judge, who heard and saw
the [witnesses], and, as he had a right to do, believed the officers rather
than Moffett.
Regarding extrajudicial confessions, the court in Moffett stated that "The
59. Williams v. State, 174 So. 2d 97, 99 (2d D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963
(1965).
60. Wade v. State, 177 So. 2d 695 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
61. 179 So. 2d 408, 414 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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failure to advise the defendant of his constitutional rights does not . . .
render an extrajudicial confession made without benefit of counsel inadmissible in evidence at the trial."6 2 To -this extent the early decisions of the
Second District Court of Appeal evidenced the same attitude found in
Montgomery v. State.
In Williams v. State,6 3 however, the Second District Court of Appeal did
an apparent about-face. In this case, the confession of a convicted first-degree
murderer was held inadmissible not only because the state failed to sustain
the burden of proof that the confession was voluntary, but also "for a more
ominous reason," citing Massiah and Escobedo. The court in Williams cited
these two cases for the proposition that defendants have a right to counsel
at all critical stages of the prosecution and any confession procured where
defendant did not have counsel is inadmissible, regardless of voluntariness.64
The court went on to state regarding Massiah's applicability: 65
While the Massiah case involved a federal Court conviction . .
the conclusion is inescapable that the same result would have been
arrived at, through utilization of the Fourteenth Amendment, if the
criminal conviction had been in a state Court.
Why this conclusion suddenly became "inescapable" is a mystery, because the
majority in Escobedo relied heavily on Massiah and quoted extensively therefrom in reaching its decision. The court also looked ahead to Miranda in
holding that the constitutional right to counsel does not arise from a request
therefor66 The court's concluding comments in Williams are most significant
67
in reflecting the more liberal attitude displayed by that court:
There is no good reason why this 2nd District Court of Appeal of
Florida should not.., follow the now-controlling doctrine of Massiah.
There can be no timidity in the field of fundamental organic rights
nor hesitance in observing stare decisis ....
Virile courts must keep
abreast of the passing times, and the passing times are not always
what we would want.... But every judicial officer of this State has
taken a solemn oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States
as well as the State of Florida; and, after all . . . "the Constitution
is what the judges say it is." That Court and those judges have spoken.
We in Florida are faced with a condition, not a theory.
Though tinged with a lingering hint of dissatisfaction, the Williams case is
reflective of a sharp divergence in attitudes from that displayed by the
Florida supreme court. Prophetic of the subsequent Miranda decision,
deemphasizing the voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility, disapproving
the admission of extrajudicial confessions without constitutional safeguards,
and abrogating the need for actual request for counsel, the disposition of the
62.

Id. at 413.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

188 So. 2d 320 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 332.
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Second District Court of Appeal in Williams v. State is much more closely
attuned to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court than to the
more narrow attitude of her sister courts.
Collins v. State,68 decided subsequent to Miranda, reinforces the conclusions of the court in Williams and is indicative of the apparently now prevailing attitude of the Florida Second District Court of Appeal. As in
Miranda, the court in Collins specifically enunciates the guidelines laid down
in a previous case, Williams v. State, for eliciting confessions from persons
in official custody upon a specific criminal charge:6 9 (1) defendant must be
clearly and effectively advised of his right to have counsel present during
any questioning; (2) if defendant indicates in any manner that he wishes
to consult an attorney, the interrogation must cease until he is able to do so;
and (3) these requirements are to be considered entirely independent of the
element of voluntariness. The Collins case, then, finalizes the conclusion
reached by Williams that the voluntary-involuntary test is no longer to be
the determining factor regarding admissibility of confessions in the Second
District Court of Appeal. It is interesting to note in this regard that the
court in Collins relied on Massiah, Escobedo, and Williams as primary
authority and only cited Miranda as "additional confirmation" of the soundness of their decision. 70 Moreover, when the Florida supreme court ordered
the Collins court to set forth more adequate reasons for its decision, that
court completely deleted all reference to Miranda as authority. 71 This again
emphasizes the apparent divergence of opinion regarding Miranda between
the Florida supreme court and the Second District Court of Appeal.
A strong dissent was registered in Collins, attempting to distinguish it
factually from the Escobedo and Williams cases. Judge Driver, dissenting,
would "reaffirm the rule that the test for admissibility of confessions in
Florida is their voluntariness, notwithstanding Escobedo."7 2 The concluding
remarks of Judge Driver's dissent echo the attitude of the Florida supreme

68. 197 So. 2d 574, modified, 203 So. 2d 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
69. 197 So. 2d 574, 587, modified, 203 So. 2d 28 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
70. Id. at 587. Prior to its deletion, a footnote in the Collins opinion was used by the
majority to make some interesting comments, also, regarding the alleged nonretroactivity of
the Miranda decision in Florida. The majority was of the opinion that, though the trial
in Collins occured before the promulgation of the Miranda decision "to all intents and purposes, Miranda should apply, since everything in Miranda was based directly upon previous
cases handed down by that Court ....Furthermore, it is doubtful if such non-retroactivity
of Miranda applies to state court cases at all." Id. at 587 n. 14 (deleted when case was
modified). This statement was based on the following language, which the court excerpted
from Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the case so often cited by other
Florida courts for just the opposite proposition: "We recognize that certain state courts
have perceived the implications of Escobedo and have therefore anticipated our holding
in Miranda. Of course, States are still entirely free to effectuate under their own law
stricter standards than those we have laid down and to apply those standards in a broader
range of cases than is required by this decision." Id. at 588.
71. Id. at 587.
72. Id. at 592 (Driver, J., dissenting).
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court and the other district courts to the line of decisions beginning with
Gideon and ending, for the time being at least, with Miranda:73
The effect of the majority ruling is . . . dismaying by virtue of
its departure from the established principles prevailing in the jurisprudence of Florida....
With all due deference to the majority opinion filed in this case,
we deem it imperative in the name of consistency and uniformity of
law that we march to the judicial cadence as called by the Supreme
Court of Florida and not hurry the court with the sure and certain
result of creating confusion and disorder in the ranks of the Bench
and Bar of this State.
The problem with the prevailing attitude of the Florida courts, reflected
in Judge Diver's dissent, is that the "judicial cadence" of the Florida supreme
court is somewhat off the beat. The ultimate pace is being set not by the
Florida supreme court, but by the United States Supreme Court. Begrudging
acceptance and overly restrictive interpretations of Gideon, Escobedo, and
Miranda can only serve to hamper the administration of criminal justice.
This analysis has not considered the larger issue of whether judicial
disobedience plays a proper role in our system of justice. Certainly the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court are not sacrosanct or above
criticism. However, the ultimate aim of Gideon, Escobedo, and Miranda is
the protection of the constitutional rights of the accused. If such protection
results in hampering law enforcement efforts, the role of Florida courts in
their tacit disobedience and implied criticism of such cases through narrow
or nonapplication is perhaps legitimate. The real solution to the problem of
75
74
crime, though, may lie elsewhere. As one writer has said:

Crime... is a major problem facing our society. It is axiomatic
that the solution does not lie in a narrow and ultra-formulistic reading
of cases interpreting the Constitution.
R. BRucE CuRRuTHERs

73. Id. at 593.
74. In this regard, one solution may lie in The Admissibility of Confessions provision
of the OMNBUS CRIME CoNTRoL AND SAFE SaREurs Acr OF 1968, 18 U.S.C.A. 3501 (Supp.
1969), which is designed to provide national assistance toward strengthening and improving
law enforcement efforts by states and units of local government. The criteria set forth
in §3501 render the Gideon standards nonconclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession and appears to reinstate the voluntary-involuntary test of admissibility.
It is too early to speculate on the effect of such standards on the state courts, as the
statute remains to be interpreted and applied. Its present applicability is limited to
criminal prosecutions instituted by the United States or the District of Columbia.
75. Rothblatt, Police Interrogationand the Right to Counsel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois:
Application v. Emasculation, 17 HAsnNGs L.J. 41, 52 (1965).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss3/6

14

